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ABSTRACT
ELIZABETH J. MENNINGA: Multiparty Mediation: A More Optimistic View
(Under the direction of Stephen E. Gent.)
Mediation is a popular conflict resolution tool used by the international community to limit
the duration and damage of civil conflicts. Yet empirical studies of conflict resolution, peace
agreements, and the techniques used to influence outcomes, treat all types of mediation efforts
as equivalent. This thesis explores how multiparty mediation efforts differ from single-party
efforts and how these differences affect the resolution of conflicts and the durability of peace
settlements. Arguing that multiparty efforts should lead to a more stable peace than single-
party mediation, these differences are tested using logistic and Cox proportional hazard analyses
on a sample of peace agreements resulting from civil conflicts. The results show that multiparty
mediation decreases the likelihood of an agreement failing compared to single party mediation
efforts in all models, but these results are not consistently statistically significant.
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Introduction
Mediation is a popular conflict resolution tool used by the international community to engage
conflicts and encourage settlements. Of the 146 peace agreements resolving civil wars signed
between 1989 and 2005, 117 reached agreement through mediation.1 Studies of conflict resolu-
tion, peace agreements, and the techniques used to influence outcomes, however, tend to treat
all mediation efforts as equivalent. As Bo¨hmelt (2010) points out, mediators self-select into
conflicts, making mediation efforts inherently non-random and the selection of multiple parties
into the same conflict at the same time even more interesting. Much of the theory building done
to understand the influence and effectiveness of mediation on conflicts assumes a single mediat-
ing party (e.g. Kydd (2003); Maoz and Terris (2006)). Seventy-three percent of the mediated
resolutions in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Peace Agreement Dataset, however, were not
single-party efforts. When multiple parties offer to mediate, individual mediator interests and
preferences will rarely align to create unanimity in the pace, process, or preferred outcomes of
negotiations. This diversity questions if single-party mediation theories are always applicable
to multiparty efforts. Furthermore, many of the empirical studies of mediation focus on the
inherent difficulty of the conflicts that turn to mediation and how mediated agreements tend
to be less successful in establishing an enduring peace than agreements reached directly by the
combatants (e.g. Beardsley (2008)). These conclusions about the usefulness of mediation over-
look the variance across mediation efforts and how this variance shapes the outcome of mediation.
Gartner and Bercovitch (2006) argue that mediation in international conflicts has opposing
selection and process effects. Since accepting mediation incurs costs on the conflicting parties,
including loss of authority and decision-making, disputants that are able to reach a resolution
without outside help would prefer to do so. Therefore, mediation is only employed in the most
difficult of conflicts. Mutwol (2009) implies that these selection effects would be even stronger
in civil wars as they tend to be more intractable than interstate conflicts. Moreover, Stedman
(1991) acknowledges that civil wars polarize society and marginalize moderate forces within the
state. By the time the participants to a civil conflict are willing to accept the costs of mediation,
finding a resolution that is not only acceptable at the time of the signing but that will also
1 This sample of agreements is taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Peace Agreement Database
(Harbom, Ho¨gbladh, and Wallensteen (2006)).
persist will be incredibly difficult, even with the help of mediation.
During the negotiations, however, mediation has positive process effects that encourage res-
olution. Mediators serve three important roles in the resolution of conflict: an informational
role through the transmission of messages and identification of common interests between the
conflicting parties, a procedural role through structuring the agenda of meetings, controlling
the pace and formality of meetings, and arranging the time and location of negotiations, and,
potentially, a coercive role rewarding concessions and punishing disagreement (Walter 2002).
Gartner and Bercovitch (2006) find support for their hypothesis that despite these positive pro-
cess effects, mediated agreements do not overcome the inherent difficulty of their conflicts. Thus
negotiations conducted with a mediator are more likely to be short-lived2 than those conducted
without a third party. Gartner and Bercovitch treat all mediation efforts as equivalent, but these
process effects need not be uniform across mediator types. Exploration of the differences in pro-
cess effects across mediation efforts would help us better understand the role of mediation in
resolving disputes and how mediation contributes to stable resolutions. While mediation efforts
vary along many dimensions, this thesis explores how multiparty mediation efforts differ from
single-party efforts and how these differences affect the resolution of conflicts and the persistence
of peace settlements.
This exploration starts with a discussion of the past literature, specifically the process effects
that enable mediation to bring difficult conflicts to resolution. Then, the past literature’s consid-
eration of multiparty mediations exposes the additional complications that adding more people
to the negotiating process produce. Finally, elaboration upon how these added complications
actually better enable multiparty mediation to resolve the conflicts in which they intervene more
effectively produces this paper’s expectation that agreements resulting from multiparty media-
tion should persist longer than those produced by a single mediator. This assertion is tested
using both logistic and duration analyses, finding mixed support.
Multiparty Mediation
For the discussion and analysis in this work, mediation is defined using Bercovitch’s (1992)
definition: “a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ own
efforts, where the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or accept an
2 Their definition of short-lived is lasting less than 8 weeks. Agreements that endure for longer than 8 weeks
are considered to be successes.
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offer of help, from an individual, group, state or organization to change, affect, or influence their
perceptions or behavior, without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law” (7).
Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (1999b) follow this broad definition of mediation, focus specifically
on multiparty mediation, and separate multiparty mediation into three distinct types: sequential,
simultaneous but independent, and coalition efforts. The designation of simultaneous mediation
captures interventions in which multiple parties offer (and are accepted) to mediate the same
conflict at the same time, but do so independently of one another. Crocker, Hampson, and Aall
define coalition efforts to be those in which a group of actors offer and are accepted in unison.
Unless the mediators explicitly characterize themselves as a coalition, identifying the mediators
as simultaneous but independent or working as a coalition can be difficult. This is amplified by
the incentives of simultaneous efforts to coordinate eventually in order to produce an agreement3
. Given the difficulty of separating simultaneous and coalition efforts, the phrase “multiparty
mediation” in this paper will refer to efforts by both multiple independent actors and coalition
meditation.4
Selection Effects
Bo¨hmelt (2010) is the first to decompose the variance between multiparty and single-party
mediation quantitatively by considering the onset of multiparty mediation5 in international
territorial disputes. Looking at the disputants’ interests, potential mediators’ interests, and the
relationship between disputants and potential mediators, Bo¨hmelt finds that multiparty medi-
ation is more likely to be used in highly salient conflicts and in conflicts with a wider gap in
military capabilities, which he argues are also the most difficult cases to mediate. This supports
Gartner and Bercovitch’s argument that mediation efforts are used only in the most difficult to
resolve cases and illustrates that this argument applies to the use of multiparty mediation as well.
Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (1999b, 2001b) compiled what are likely the most expansive
collection of work by academics and practitioners on the experiences, conditions, and effects of
multiparty mediation in resolving international and civil wars. The qualitative studies of these
volumes explore conflicts in which a multiparty mediation effort has been accepted, highlighting
3 See, for example, Crocker’s account of the efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union, which were
initially simultaneous but at odds with each other and then became a coordinated effort, in Namibia (Crocker
1999).
4 The exclusion of sequential mediation efforts is not meant as a reflection of their importance, but rather their
very different nature. Sequential efforts involve multiple mediators intervening at different points of the conflict in
order to respond to the current conflict dynamics and encourage communication, compromise, and peace. These
efforts are therefore inherently conditioned by the past efforts, their previous success or failure, and the type of
agreements that stemmed from those interactions. A thorough analysis of this is outside the scope of the current
paper but merits future exploration and research.
5 He defines multiparty mediation more narrowly to be efforts by a coalition only.
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the role multiparty mediations have played in negotiating these disputes and the lessons learned
by practitioners and scholars from these cases. Overall, these chapters conclude that multiparty
mediation is complicated, time consuming, and potentially counter-productive to establishing
peace, much less a lasting one. This pessimism reflects the selection process that presents
mediators with the most difficult disputes as well as the extra complication of additional players in
the negotiating process. These factors that make multiparty mediation complicated, however, are
also the factors that allow for a more thorough consideration of the conflict, a more comprehensive
and relevant solution to the dispute, and thus a more lasting peace than single-party mediation.
Mediation’s Process Effects
If mediators only see the most difficult conflicts, and thus the agreements they negotiate are
so fragile, then why do mediators continue to expend time and resources intervening in conflicts
and disputants continue to ask for mediators to assist in the negotiating process? Mediation’s
process effects help mediators encourage parties to even entrenched conflicts meet at the negoti-
ation table and compromise. Rubin (1992) identifies six bases of power a mediator can employ:
reward, coercive, expert6 , legitimate7 , referent8 , and informational. By offering rewards or
threatening negative sanctions, mediators can change the negotiating environment and influence
the parties’ expected outcomes and payoffs, making settlement look more attractive. In addition
to altering the anticipated costs and benefits of the conflicting parties, mediators help overcome
informational problems by sharing knowledge and providing counsel to the disputants. Addi-
tionally, they can provide legitimacy to the negotiations giving the government political cover9
or use expertise to recast the dispute, shaping the perceived bargaining space. Furthermore,
mediation in civil disputes is more successful when the intermediary has leverage over the com-
batants (Assefa 1987). Stedman (1991) identifies several ways mediators can exert leverage over
the combatants: coercion, remuneration, charisma, appeal to values and principles (normative
conformity), and shared knowledge or information. These sources of leverage rely not only on
the power of the mediator to change the negotiating environment, but also the mediator’s con-
nections and relations with the disputants that promote trust, understanding, and potentially
agreement.
6 Expert power refers to the use of real or perceived expertise to influence outcomes (Rubin 1992, 255).
7 Legitimate power “requires the influencer to persuade on the basis of having the right to make a request.”
(Rubin 1992, 255)
8 Referent power is based in the structure and type of relationship between the mediator and combatant (Rubin
1992, 256).
9 Beardsley (2010) discusses mediation’s role as a source of political cover for governments facing unpopular
negotiations or concessions.
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Mediators can also communicate with the parties in the dispute directly, even if these parties
are not willing to talk to each other. This indirect connection across opposing sides increases
the inclusiveness of the negotiations, a critical characteristic of a durable peace (Licklider 2001).
Inclusiveness is difficult for states experiencing civil conflict to achieve alone. Incumbent govern-
ments to a civil conflict are reluctant to negotiate with their opposition as they do not want to
legitimize the rebel movement (Mutwol 2009). Both the state at war and neighboring states will
be reluctant to legitimize the opposition for fear of encouraging other domestic or regional fac-
tions to use violence to gain concessions from the government (Walter 2002). In such situations,
mediators can play an important role by talking to both formal parties to the negotiations as well
as parties that are not officially part of the process, but capable of influencing the agreement’s
stability. Crocker’s (1999) discussion of the Namibian conflict supports this assertion as the
United States’ ability to link issues across Southern Africa and involve other relevant African
states led to a successful resolution.
Finally, scholars of civil conflict resolution have found that agreements accompanied by third-
party security guarantees are more likely to persist (e.g. Walter (2002)). Such arrangements
allay fears of defection from the agreement, helping to resolve the security dilemma disputants
face during and after negotiations. Such agreements, however, require international actors or
organizations to not only agree to, but also follow through on, providing such a security force.
Despite the benefits, the international political will for such post-conflict intervention is often
lacking as the international community faces free-riding and collective action problems (Solomon
1999). Nonetheless, Walter (2002) finds a substantial correlation between the participation of
a mediator during the negotiation process and the provision for third-party enforcement in the
resulting agreement. This correlation is perhaps not surprising as the presence of a mediator
indicates the conflict is of interest to at least some members of the international community and
provides an advocate who can encourage and coordinate an international security force.
These process effects so far discussed, however, do not consider the variance across mediation
types. They discuss the possible influence mediators can use, but not under what circumstances
these influences will be more or less effective in shaping the negotiating environment and con-
structing a stable, lasting peace agreement. The following sections consider how these process
effects are different for multiparty mediation, beginning with the commonly presented negative
process effects of multiparty mediation and how they make multiparty mediation efforts even
more difficult.
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Challenges of Multiparty Mediation
The case studies in Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (1999b, 2001b) identify several recurring
challenges faced by multiparty mediation. In a multiparty mediation effort, each mediator has
unique interests or intentions that motivate them to offer (or accept an invitation) to mediate the
dispute in the first place. Touval and Zartman (1985) argue that mediators are rarely indifferent,
even if the preference of the mediator is for peace above all else (see also Bercovitch (1992)).
Furthermore, mediation is costly. Grieg and Regan (2008) consider who intervenes in which
conflicts, asserting that serving as a mediator incurs reputational, political, and strategic costs.
Therefore, the pool of possible mediators is limited to actors who also anticipate benefits from
resolving the conflict. These benefits will differ across mediators. Thus, all mediators will rarely
have the same preferences or the same ideal outcomes, resulting in contradicting claims about
the goals of the mediation efforts, the process and direction of the negotiations, or the intent
and objectives of the mediators. These contradictions not only slow negotiations down, but also
encourage the disputants to search for the most sympathetic mediator to their grievances or
preferences. Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (1999a, 674) refer to these complications as “mixed
messages” and “forum shopping”, which undermine the value of mediation by fractionalizing the
process.
Also given the costs of mediation, the presence of other mediators in the negotiations can
encourage individual actors to free-ride off other mediator’s efforts (Crocker, Hampson, and
Aall 2001a). These incentives are not unique to a specific mediator or type of mediator. Thus,
multiparty mediation can result in many parties but little action, as each mediator waits for
the others to do the hard work. In a related way, potential mediators, especially states, want
to avoid blame for failed policies. Therefore, states have an incentive to minimize involvement
at critical moments when the risk of failure is highest, hoping other mediators will keep the
negotiations on track. These incentives result in the loss of valuable opportunities throughout
the negotiation process.
Techniques used to encourage talks or influence outcomes can also generate collective action
problems. Coercion is difficult to enforce as mediators with opposing interests might undermine
such efforts. Positive inducements to compromise lead to additional debates over who will bear
the costs of such incentives (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001a, 506). Security guarantees,
such as monitoring demilitarized zones to reduce anxiety during negotiations, would be slow
to implement as distributing responsibility for such arrangements must be worked out not only
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with the parties that are in conflict, but also among the various mediators.
Even before these discussions of techniques and security guarantees can occur, the mem-
bers of the mediation effort must have a shared analysis of the conflict and potential solutions.
Disagreement over the importance of the causes of the conflict, resulting from the divergent in-
terests, biases, and objectives of the various parties to the mediation, can lead to intra-mediation
disputes over solutions (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001a, 506). This added level of needing to
reach agreement among the mediators to order to then try to reach an agreement between the
parties at war lead Crocker, Hampson, and Aall to conclude that multiparty mediation is at the
very least inherently more complicated than mediation by a single party. Soto (1999) goes so far
as to say that collective mediation does not work and “may well be a contradiction in terms”
(382). While the literature so far has presented a pessimistic view of multiparty mediation’s role
in conflict resolution, the added levels of complication and discussion that accompany additional
mediators’ participation in the negotiation process is precisely what makes multiparty mediation
more effective.
Multiparty Mediation’s Unique Advantages
Multiparty mediation brings together international actors that are all interested enough
in the outcome of a particular domestic conflict to intervene despite (or perhaps because of)
another actor’s decision to intervene. Multiparty mediation unites actors with different types
of power and sources of leverage, increasing the strategies available to the mediators as they
influence the negotiation environment to encourage a settlement. Multiparty mediation efforts
are also more easily able to include peripheral third parties that, while not central to the conflict,
can affect the stability of the agreement. Furthermore, multiparty mediation efforts have more
resources at their disposal than single-party mediators, increasing the comprehensiveness of the
final agreement and the probability that the settlement will include a third-party security guar-
antee or oversight commissions. Together these positive effects of multiparty mediation generate
more effective peace agreements than those negotiated by a single mediator. Thus, multiparty
mediation negotiates agreements that are more likely to persist. The rest of this section explores
these mechanisms and how they generate more durable agreements.
Before continuing, however, clarifying what “effective” means in this paper is necessary. The
effectiveness of a mediation effort can be measured along four dimensions: whether or not they
produce an agreement, the optimality of that agreement, the fairness of the agreement, and
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the stability of the agreement (Hopmann 2001). The production of an agreement is a very
difficult hurdle for mediators. In fact, often the measure of success in the literature is this first
dimension. Unfortunately, not all agreements that are signed, however, last. Thus, this first
dimension represents a rather short-sighted definition of success. Optimality and fairness of the
agreements, while important characteristics, are very subjective determinations and thus difficult
to systematically study. Furthermore, the perceived fairness of the agreement will be captured
indirectly by whether or not the disputants sign onto the agreement and then if they continue
to abide by the agreement. Therefore, the fourth dimension is of greatest interest in this paper.
The long-term stability of the agreement reflects the influence that the agreement had on the
underlying causes of the conflict as well as the agreement’s impact on the state and its citizens.
Therefore, in this paper a mediation effort is effective if the agreement it produces is stable
and endures. Exploring the success of multiparty mediation along the other three dimensions is
reserved for future research.
Different potential mediators have different comparative advantages. States are more flexible
than organizations, but less able to demonstrate impartiality; individuals often have more flexi-
bility as they do not need to consider the political interests of their home state or organization
but very little material power. Intergovernmental organizations have greater legitimacy and are
perceived as less biased than other potential mediators, while regional organizations are more
familiar with the conflict environment and the actors involved both directly or indirectly in the
dispute10 . Despite this deeper knowledge, many regional organizations operate by consensus
which can hinder the effectiveness of such organizations when acting alone11 . Therefore, while
some mediators may be more effective in different types of conflicts or environments, multiple
actors can take advantage of their relative strengths and weaknesses, play to their advantages,
and together influence negotiations more efficiently with all available tools.
Multiparty mediation, therefore, brings together various actors with different types of power
and leverage to encourage cooperation. A mediator that is well suited to exercise reward power,
perhaps in the form of aid packages or trade deals, is often not also able to exert coercive power
easily should the parties in the conflict need additional incentives. Thus, while additional medi-
ators might require additional coordination of efforts in order to decide which sources of power
to use when, the presence of these additional mediators presents new strategies to the mediators,
10 See for example the discussion discussion of intergovernmental organizations and the comparative advantages
of the UN versus regional organizations for conflict prevention and resolution in Peck (2001).
11 McDougall’s account of the negotiations in Haiti show both the value of regional organizations, but also how
regional organizations alone can inhibit progress. In the case of Haiti involvement by both the OAS and Canada
was very important in navigating the negotiation process effectively (McDougall 1999).
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better enabling them to respond to changes in the conflict environment. Different actors will also
have different amounts of leverage, but more importantly, different mediators will have leverage
over different parties to the conflict. An IGO might have coercive or remuneration leverage over
the incumbent government officially recognized by the United Nations or receiving aid from the
International Monetary Fund. Non-governmental organizations might be able to exert normative
conformity over the rebels, or at least their supporters12 . Often, civil wars persist for as long as
they do because of outside support given to both the opposition and government forces, and thus
an agreement signed with at least the tacit support of the suppliers of the disputants is more
likely to hold than one that does not. Finding a mediator that possesses leverage over not only
the disputants, but also those shaping the conflict environment by funding or otherwise sup-
pling the militarized forces is therefore valuable and will most likely require more than one actor.
While forum-shopping is a concern of multiparty mediation when it results in fractional-
ization, the ability for the conflicting parties to identify a mediator they believe to be either
impartial or who will protect their interests deepens negotiations by drawing the parties to the
conflict more fully into the negotiating process. By presenting the disputants with a media-
tor they trust as part of the negotiation team, the disputants will be more willing to share
their concerns, interests, and needs, resulting in a more complete understanding of the parties’
grievances, concerns, fears, and demands. A deeper understanding of the parties’ perceptions of
the conflict enables the mediators to more effectively encourage compromise and structure the
peace settlement to account for future concerns and post-war anxieties.
Moreover, internal conflicts are entangled in wider regional and international strategic envi-
ronments. The inclusion of more than one mediator with different views and knowledge of the
conflict increases the negotiators’ understanding of the context in which they find themselves,
facilitating communication with or consideration of other relevant third-parties. Bartoli high-
lights the importance of the partnership between the Community of Sant’ Egidio and the United
States in providing the United States enough context about the history, roots, and implications
of the Mozambique conflict to adequately negotiate the peace (1999). Influencing or even just
interacting with this larger context is difficult for single-party mediation. A single mediator that
is both knowledgeable about and willing to be involved in the negotiation process is likely to be
perceived as biased. If not initially perceived as such, then extending a line of communication
to an unfriendly or unpopular actor might damage their credibility with another party to the
12 Bartoli (1999) illustrates this through her telling of how the Sant’ Egidio community’s role in communicating
with and relating to the Mozambique civil society was a critical component of in reaching a peace agreement
without retaliation.
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conflict, making the balance between inclusion and perception difficult. With more than one
mediator, however, channels of discussion can be opened more easily as each mediator will have
different reputational concerns. Additionally, more mediators mean more resources. By not act-
ing alone, the mediators distribute the material costs of time and personnel required to gather
information. More mediators mean more time and personnel available to talk with peripheral
parties to the peace. This extends the inclusiveness of the process, deepening the strength of
any resulting agreement and improving the probability of an enduring peace.
While distributing responsibility and costs is non-trivial, multiparty mediation efforts already
involve a group of international actors in communication about the best resolution for a given
conflict. Thus, while still demanding significant effort to arrange and implement, multiparty
mediations are more likely to result in security guarantees or oversight commissions when nec-
essary to encourage a more lasting peace. Multiparty mediation efforts have more resources
with which to organize such arrangements, but also a greater understanding than single-part
mediation, identifying more accurately what form of third-party involvement during the im-
plementation of the agreement would be most valuable. All of these advantages to multiparty
mediation highlight how multiparty mediation results in a more flexible, powerful, and inclusive
negotiation environment. This environment encourages deeper consideration and understanding
of the grievances, context, and relevant parties to the conflict. This manifests in settlements
that not only temporarily terminate the fighting but also produce a lasting peace, generating
this thesis’s first testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Peace agreements negotiated by multiparty mediation will endure longer than
agreements negotiated by a single third party.
Despite the many advantages of multiparty mediation, the risks of forum shopping, mixed
messages, and free riding are still challenges that must be overcome. A leader who, while a part
of the multiparty effort, steps up to consolidate, direct, and unify the efforts of the various third-
parties should minimize the ability of the disputants to exploit the multiparty arrangement by
coordinating the efforts and keeping track of the overall negotiation process. Moreover, sharing
the leadership role can overcome the incentives to free ride or avoid risk to the detriment of the
negotiations. For example, in the mediation efforts in Haiti, leadership shifted from the OAS to
the UN to the US throughout the negotiations process, allowing each actor to be sensitive to
its constituents’ needs while continuing to encourage peace and support a settlement.13 Thus,
13 For a more detailed discussion of the negotiations in Haiti as well as the OAS, UN, and US’s roles in the
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the presence of a leader not only helps the mediators overcome the problems of multiparty
mediation, but it also enables a more effective solution as it facilitates continuous progress and
coordinates the efforts of each mediator to ensure that their knowledge, expertise, and efforts
are incorporated in the settlement that results from these efforts. This generates the second
testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Agreements reached through multiparty mediation efforts that are coordinated
by a leader will persist longer than those in which the mediation team is a collection of equals.
The next section explains the data and methods through which these hypotheses are tested.
Data and Methods
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Peace Agreement Dataset14 (Harbom, Ho¨gbladh,
and Wallensteen 2006) contains a sample of civil war peace agreements signed from 1989 and
2005. For inclusion in the dataset at least two of the opposing primary parties to the armed
conflict15 had to sign the agreement, and the agreement had to address the incompatibilities of
the conflict by either solving or regulating the disputants’ grievances.16
The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset includes both the date upon which the agreement was
signed, as well as the date upon which the agreement is considered to have ended.17 These
dates were used to code the endurance of the agreement. First, a dichotomous variable captures
whether or not the agreement lasted for at least 10 years.18 A second measure of the dependent
variable counts the number of months for which the agreement lasted after being signed. Each
of these measures will be regressed separately on the following independent variables.
process see (McDougall 1999).
14 The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset is downloadable from http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/.
Version 1.0 was used for these analyses.
15 The UCDP defines an armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or terri-
tory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results
in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Gleditsch et al. 2002).
16 While not perfect, the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset is the best data currently available for this project.
Many of the alternative sources that report signed agreements do not record the duration of the agreement. Others
(such as Regan (2002) and Walter (2002)) include mediation as a dummy variable without enough information
to disaggregate multiparty from single-party mediation.
17 An agreement is considered to have ended when one side annuls the agreement or “violence clearly shows
that the parties have left the agreement” (Harbom, Ho¨gbladh, and Wallensteen 2006).
18 This variable was alternatively coded with the cut-off relaxed from 10 years to 5 and then 2 years to consider
the effect of mediation and leadership on shorter term peaces as well. Only the 10 year cut-off is discussed in the
text as the primary focus of this paper is the effects of multiparty mediation on assisting in establishing a lasting
peace.
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The key independent variable is the type of mediation that assisted the negotiating process.
The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset lists the third parties to the conflict if any as well as a
description of their role in producing the agreement. The type of mediation was coded from
the list of third parties and the accompanying comments. When the UCDP Peace Agreement
Dataset’s description was vague, alternative data sources (primarily Regan (2002)) were con-
sulted to identify in what capacity the listed third parties intervened. Altogether this generates
a categorical measure of mediation type: no mediation, single-party mediation, or multiparty
mediation.
The second key independent variable is leadership. Leadership is considered present when
the mediation team included a major power or the warring state’s former colonial ruler. This
coding captures the states with the most individual leverage over the conflict and thus attempts
to capture if the mediation team had a member who would be seen by both the country in
conflict and the rest of the mediators as a natural leadership choice. Obviously this coding has
limitations as the United States can participate in a mediation team without necessarily taking a
leadership role; regional powers or neighbors to the conflict could also play the role of leader for
many mediation teams. This proxy, however, is a more conservative measure than one including
additional regional states. While qualitatively accessing the mediation team of each agreement
to identify whether or not leadership was present, such determinations are difficult ex post and
subject to researcher subjectivity and thus bias. Therefore, this paper uses the leadership proxy
of major powers and colonial rulers.
In order to account for other characteristics of the conflict or negotiation environment that
would influence the durability of peace, several control variables were also included. Hartzell,
Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001) argues that the opposition’s past experience with the government
should influence the amount of trust and mutual willingness to abide by the settlement. There-
fore, higher levels of democracy at the time of the agreement’s signing should positively influence
opposition expectations about future interactions, and thus increasing the probability the peace
will persist. The level of democracy is recorded from the Polity IV Project19 as the polity score
of the state in the year in which the agreement was signed.
Another common control is the intensity of the conflict. Conflict intensity is an indicator of
19 The Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009 Dataset can be accessed at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm.
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the combatants’ readiness for resolution (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006; Hartzell, Hoddie, and
Rothchild 2001; Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991). Rothchild, for example, asserts that
the greater intensity of the conflict the more likely the disputants’ should seek a resolution,
but the more distrusting and impatient they will be. Thus increases in conflict intensity are
expected to decrease the probability of that the peace agreement succeeds. Using the UCDP
Battle-Related Deaths Dataset’s20 best estimate for the number of battle-related deaths in each
conflict-year, intensity is measured as the conflict’s cumulative total of battle deaths in the in the
year the agreement was signed, divided by 1,000.21 The duration of the war, however, should
lengthen the duration of the post-agreement peace (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001). As
the conflict persists, both sides learn more about the conflict and their opponent making a
settlement more appealing. Thus, the longer the war, the more likely a signed agreement will
produce a stable, lasting peace. The duration of the conflict is coded as the number of years
between the conflict’s first inclusion in the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset22 and the last year
of its inclusion before the signing of the peace agreement.
Finally, whether or not the agreement provided for a peace-keeping operation (coded from the
UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset) was included in order to control for the effect of institutional
arrangements made within the agreement. A peace-keeping operation is coded as present if the
agreement provided for the provision of an operation. The indicator does not consider whether
or not the peace-keepers ever arrived in the country or for how long they were deployed.
Other control variables were estimated in alternative model specifications but none of these
controls substantively or statistically changed the results of the following regressions, and thus
are not included in the final models discussed and reported below. These additional controls
were coded from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset and included the primary issue (territory
or government) over which the war was fought (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006; Bercovitch and
Houston 2000; Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991) as well as institutional arrangements
within the peace agreement such as territorial autonomy (Walter 2004; Hartzell, Hoddie, and
Rothchild 2001), the provision for a commission to oversee or monitor the implementation of
the agreement (Mutwol 2009), and the provision for a power-sharing arrangement (Walter 2002;
Mutwol 2009).
20 The UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2010, 1989-2008 is part of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
and is available from Uppsala University at www.ucdp.uu.se.
21 The average number of battle deaths per year was also coded and substituted for total battle deaths in all
subsequent analyses with no significant or substantial changes in results.
22 The UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2010, 1946-2009 can be accessed from http://www.ucdp.uu.se.
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Model and Results
The first model tests if agreements mediated by multiple parties are more likely to generate
an enduring peace than those mediated by single-party efforts. A logistic regression, regressing
whether or not the agreement endured for at least 10 years on mediation type, leadership, the
interaction between multiparty mediation and leadership as well as the control variables.23 Two
iterations of this model are reported. The first iteration includes all peace agreements to civil
conflicts in the UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset. Despite the discussion of selection effects
and how mediators face the most difficult cases, a selection model is not appropriate for this
research design. The focus of this paper is not when conflicts seek mediators, or when mediators
offer their services, but rather the durability of resulting agreeemnts. A selection model focusing
on the choice to employ multiparty mediation would miss the variance I am most interested in
understanding, which is if single and mulitparty mediation efforts have different implications
for the endurance of a peace agreement. Therefore, the inclusion of all peace agreements most
appropriately explores this question.
In the first model, the interaction of two categorical variables generates five possible states
of the negotiations relevant to the hypotheses: no mediation, single-party mediation without
leadership, single-party mediation with leadership, multiparty mediation without leadership,
and multiparty mediation with leadership. The second model only has four possible states, re-
moving no mediation. The baseline category for both models is single-party mediation without
leadership. The results from these logistic regressions are reported in Table 1.
23 Two alternative specifications in which the dependent variable captured whether or not the peace lasted 2 or
5 years were also estimated. The results of these specifications are in the appendix.
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Table 1: Logistic Regression of Peace Endurance
All Cases Mediation Only
(Intercept) -1.45 -3.73
(1.15) (2.25)
No Mediation 2.53*
(1.23)
Multiparty Mediation 2.66* 2.71*
(1.14) (1.17)
Leadership 1.44 2.06
(1.86) (3.85)
Polity 0.07 0.07
(0.06) (0.07)
Battle Deaths -0.05 -0.07
(0.05) (0.08)
War Duration -0.12 -0.22
(0.10) (0.12)
Peace-Keeping -1.49* -1.45*
(0.68) (0.72)
Multiparty Mediation -1.11 -0.88
x Leadership (1.99) (2.04)
N 87 73
Note: * indicates a p-value < 0.05
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The baseline category for mediation is single-party me-
diation.
Table 1 indicates that for the model with all civil war agreements, observations with no
mediator are more likely to persist than agreements mediated by a single-party. Likewise, mul-
tiparty mediation generates agreements that are, in the absence of leadership, more likely to
persist than those resulting from single-party efforts. Moreover, the effects of no mediation and
multiparty mediation without leadership are not statistically different.24 This seems to indicate
that despite the selection effects that present mediators with the most difficult cases, multiparty
mediation helps overcome those unfavorable selections. Furthermore, this supports the thesis
that the treatment of all mediation efforts as equivalent masks interesting variance and results
in unnecessarily pessimistic conclusions about the durability of a mediated peace.
Leadership in single-party mediation efforts (i.e. when the mediator was a major power or
the colonial ruler) increases the probability that a peace will persist for 10 years over single-party
mediation without leadership, but this increase is not statistically significant.25 When a multi-
party mediation effort also has leadership, the probability the conflict will endure increases, but
this increase is not statistically different from single-party mediation with leadership.26 Alto-
24 The difference of means calculation results in a t-statistic of -0.1840621 with a corresponding p-value of
0.8544424 on 78 degrees of freedom.
25 The model was tested for multicollinearity to see if high correlation between leadership and the other inde-
pendent variables lead to exaggerated standard errors, but no variance inflation factors were larger than 10.
26 The marginal effect of mediation with leadership generates a t-statistic of 0.9299561 with a corresponding
p-value of 0.355263 on 78 degrees of freedom.
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gether this indicates that leadership, at least as measured here, is not a significant factor in the
probability of a peace enduring.
In order to more easily understand the results from Table 1, Table 2 reports the predicted
probability of persisting for 10 years for each of these possible mediation states, holding all other
variables at their means.
Table 2: Predicted Probabilities Full Sample
Without Leadership With Leadership
No Mediation 0.49
Single-Party 0.07 0.24
Multiparty 0.52 0.60
Note: All other variables held at their means.
Agreements resulting from single-party mediation without leadership have a probability of
persisting for at least 10 years of only 7 percent, while no mediation has a probability of success
of 49 percent. This reinforces Gartner and Bercovitch’s (2006) finding that mediation settle-
ments are not as persistent as agreements reached without a third party. The selection argument,
therefore, seems to hold until the predicted probability of an agreement resulting from multiparty
mediation efforts is considered. Even without leadership, multiparty generated agreements have
a 52 percent probability of enduring. Adding leadership increases the probability of a multiparty
mediation effort persisting to 60 percent and a single-party mediation effort to 24 percent. The
differences between the predicted probability of single and multiparty mediation indicates that
perhaps the different process effects at work in different mediation types changes the effectiveness
of these efforts substantially.
The only control variable that is significant in the model is the presence of a peace-keeping
operation after the conflict. Surprisingly, the provision for a peace-keeping operation decreases
the likelihood that the peace will persist a decade. While this result contradicts expectations,
given the costs of peace-keeping, such operations will only find the international support nec-
essary for their provision in conflicts where the perceived costs and risk of failure is very high,
supporting works such as Fortna (2004).
When estimating the logistic regression on the subset of the data that only includes mediated
disputes, few changes in the results are evident. Agreements reached by multiparty mediation
without leadership are still significantly more likely to endure than single-party efforts. Single-
party mediation efforts with leadership are more likely to persist than those without leadership,
but not statistically significantly so. In this model, the coefficients on leadership and the inter-
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action term are highly correlated.27 While multicollinearity is to be expected when including
an interaction term in a model, this indicates that the standard errors on these coefficient es-
timates are larger than they ought to be, perhaps understating the significance of the effect of
leadership. Once again multiparty mediation with leadership produces agreements that are more
likely to persist than single-party agreements with leadership, but the difference is not statisti-
cally significant.28 Also in line with the full sample specification, the only control variable that
is statistically significant is the provision in the agreement for peace-keeping forces. Predicted
probabilities from the second model are reported below to more easily consider the effects of me-
diation and leadership on the probability of success. Once again, all other independent variables
are held at their means.
Table 3: Predicted Probabilities Mediation Only
Without Leadership With Leadership
Single-Party 0.06 0.17
Multiparty 0.49 0.57
Note: All other variables held at their means.
These predicted probabilities are not substantively different from the first logistic model con-
tinuing to reflect the variance between single and multiparty mediation. These logistic models
together indicate that the past dichotomous treatment of whether or not mediation assisted the
negotiations does not provide a complete picture of the effects of mediation on successful conflict
resolution. While single-party mediation efforts do not seem to overcome the selection effects
mediation faces, multiparty efforts are as likely to endure as those agreements reached bilaterally.
One of the primary benefits of estimating a logistic model is that it dichotomizes the obser-
vations into simple successes and failures. This reduces the necessary precision of measurement
of the dependent variable. Identifying exactly when an agreement ended is very difficult. Parties
might break off the agreement but not act upon this break for several months, thereby leading
observers to consider the agreement still in effect. Alternatively, small amounts of violence by
spoilers could generate uncertainty about the parties’ commitment to the peace, resulting in
an end to the peace as these attacks incite retaliatory violence. Coders must then determine
if the initial attacks marked the end of the agreement, if the parties stayed committed despite
the spoiler’s efforts, or if they stayed committed for a certain period of time before nullifying
the agreement. The logistic model only requires the measurement to capture whether or not
the model persisted 10 years, not exactly how many months under or over 10 years it lasted,
27 The estimates of leadership and the interaction term both have variance inflation factors of about 31 No other
coefficients had high variance inflation factors.
28 The marginal effect of multiparty mediation produces a t-statistic of 1.07505 with an associated p-value of
0.2863268 on 65 degrees of freedom.
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decreasing the amount of potential measurement error in the dependent variable. Unfortunately,
logistic regression models have their own shortcomings. Specifically, logistic regressions cannot
account for the censoring of data. Peace agreements ongoing in 2005, but in place for less than
10 years cannot be included in the analysis, causing a truncation of the dataset as seen by the
decreases in sample size from the total 144 observations in which data on all variables were
available29 to 78.
To address this problem of truncation, the effects of multiparty mediation were also estimated
using a Cox proportional hazard model. This duration model does not examine if the peace
persisted or not, but rather for how long did the peace persist and how does mediation type
influence the hazard rate of failure. Cox proportional hazard models account for the right-
censoring of this data in the estimation process, thus resolving the truncation problem. The
specification of the right-hand side of the model was the same as the logistic, replacing the
dependent variable with the number of months the agreement lasted.30 The Cox proportional
hazard model was also estimated on the full dataset as well as only those agreements that resulted
from mediation efforts in order to better capture the effect of leadership. The results of these
estimations are reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Cox Proportional Hazard Results
All Cases Mediation Only
No Mediation -0.65
(0.51)
Multiparty Mediation -0.51 -0.47
(0.39) (0.40)
Leadership 0.10 0.36
(1.06) (2.19)
Polity -0.06 -0.07
(0.04) (0.04)
Battle Deaths 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.04)
War Duration -0.07 -0.03
(0.05) (0.06)
Peace-Keeping 0.76* 0.67
(0.36) (0.38)
Multiparty Mediation -0.20 -0.20
x Leadership (1.17) (1.17)
Likelihood Ratio Test 18.86* 11.93
Wald Test 16.89* 10.67
Note: * indicates a p-value < 0.05
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Both mod-
els satisfied the proportionality assumption.
In the first model, the coefficients on no mediation and multiparty mediation are negative,
29 Two of the 146 observations are missing polity scores.
30 The model was also estimated with number of years as the dependent variable but the use of years did not
change the model output.
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indicating that no mediation and multiparty mediation decrease the log odds of failure. Their
standard errors, however, indicate that these decreases are not statistically significant. Expo-
nentiating the coefficients, no mediation decreases the hazard of failure by 48 percent while
multiparty mediation without leadership decreases the hazard of failure by 40 percent when
compared to the baseline of single-party mediation without leadership. Leadership in a single-
party mediation effort has a positive coefficient, indicating that it increases the hazard of failure,
but this coefficient is substantively small and not statistically significant. Exponentiating the
coefficient on leadership indicates that the increase in hazard is only 6 percent. Multiparty
mediation efforts with leadership have a non-significant effect of -0.10 on the log-odds of failure
or a decrease in the hazard rate of about 10 percent over single-party mediation with leadership.
Similar to the logistic regressions, the only control variable that appears significant is the provi-
sion for peace keeping operations. Peace-keeping operations increase the risk of failure, raising
the hazard rate by 114 percent. An increase in number of battle deaths increases the hazard
rate while increases in level of democracy and the duration of the war decrease the hazard rate.
While these results match the theoretical expectations, they are not statistically significant in
these models. The results from the second model are very similar to the results of the first
model, although the effect of the provision for peace-keeping operations is no longer statistically
significant.
Conclusions
This paper explored the variance across types of mediation, specifically differences between
single and multiparty efforts. Considering the process effects of mediation and the unique ad-
vantages of multiparty mediation in shaping the negotiating environment and influencing the
disputants, multiparty mediations were expected to generate more durable peace agreements
than those resulting from single-party mediation. An empirical analysis of 146 peace agreements
tested this assertion.
The logistic and duration analyses provided limited support for the hypotheses laid out here.
The logistic regressions indicate that multiparty mediation has a distinct effect from that of
single-party mediation producing agreements that are more likely to endure. The direction of
the coefficients in the duration model also support the hypotheses, but the lack of statistical
significance indicates the relationship found could be the result of random chance. As discussed
above, duration models require a more precise measurement of the dependent variable than logis-
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tic regression. This increased precision is likely accompanied by increased measurement error, as
identifying the specific period at which the agreement terminated is difficult. Measurement error
in the dependent variable, while leaving the coefficient estimates unbiased, produces inefficiency
and increases standard errors. Furthermore, none of the models found the effect of leadership to
be significant. Perhaps this indicates that the value of leadership has been overstated, but more
likely, this indicates that the measure of leadership used in this paper is inadequate to capture
the concept of interest. The lack of significance on all variables, including those found to be
significant in the literature, calls into question these models and exhibits the need for further
exploration of the theory and hypotheses proposed in this thesis.
Additionally, the consideration of alternative measures of the effectiveness of mediation (such
as whether or not the negotiations reach an agreement) would provide a more complete picture of
mediation’s influence in the negotiation process. While this thesis focused on a particular type of
variance in mediation (single versus multiparty), many other divisions that potentially influence
the likelihood an agreement is reached as well as its durability deserve exploration. Sequential
mediation and if or how mediators build upon past efforts is one such avenue for exploration as
is a more systematic empirical study of the influences different actors (e.g. state, IGO, or NGO)
have on the negotiating environment. Such explorations will continue to evaluate if the lessons
learned so far that mediation is costly and potentially counter-productive are valid, or if the
relationship between mediation types and success is a more complicated story. The more this
complicated story is understood the more accurate expectations of mediation’s effects will be,
the more appropriately mediation will be employed, and perhaps the better prepared mediators
will be for their task.
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Appendix
Table 5: Logistic Regression 2 Year Threshold
All Cases Mediation Only
(Intercept) 0.87 0.89
(0.54) (1.01)
No Mediation 0.78
(0.73)
Multiparty Mediation 0.08 0.09
(0.53) (0.54)
Leadership -0.91 -1.86
(1.41) (2.89)
Polity 0.10* 0.11*
(0.05) (0.05)
Battle Deaths -0.05 -0.05
(0.04) (0.05)
War Duration 0.07 0.05
(0.07) (0.07)
Peace-Keeping -0.89 -0.97*
(0.48) (0.49)
Multiparty Mediation 0.83 0.89
x Leadership (1.56) (1.56)
N 139 112
Note: * indicates a p-value < 0.05
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 6: Logistic Regression 5 Year Threshold
All Cases Mediation Only
(Intercept) -0.54 -1.11
(0.68) (1.20)
No Mediation 0.99
(0.74)
Multiparty Mediation 1.09 1.00
(0.60) (0.60)
Leadership 0.50 0.78
(1.43) (2.86)
Polity 0.08 0.08
(0.05) (0.05)
Battle Deaths -0.05 -0.04
(0.04) (0.06)
War Duration 0.10 0.21
(0.08) (0.09)
Peace-Keeping -1.07* -1.00
(0.53) (0.54)
Multiparty Mediation -0.60 -0.43
xLeadership (1.57) (1.54)
N 117 95
Note: * indicates a p-value < 0.05
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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